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Abstract 
 
Rather than straightforwardly resulting from rational design, negotiation and decision making, 
management control structures in interfirm and intrafirm relationships result from complex 
interactions in networks of associations. To understand the emergence, mediation and development 
of a management control structure this study views such structure as a relational ontology in a 
network of associations that carries a process of governization. Governization refers to the assembly 
and qualification of actors, actions, spaces and devices that may produce a pattern that can be 
labeled as ‘governance’.   
The paper particularly contributes by demonstrating how the emergence, mediation and 
development of a management control structure for a shared service center is the result of iterative 
cycles of both centrally-controlled framing activity and drifting overflows. In short, by viewing it as a 
relational ontology the paper unlocks the management control structure and puts it at the center of 
dynamics. Here, the management control structure is an inscriber rather than a prescriber or 
describer. 
 
Keywords 
Governization, management control structure, framing, overflows, relational agency, shared service 
center 
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Introduction 
From a rationalist’s perspective governance and management control structures of interfirm and 
intrafirm relationships  are relatively stable solutions to control problems in existing relationships 
(see also Caglio and Ditillo, 2008).  Particularly drawing on transaction cost economics a substantial 
number of studies a priori distinguish two categories of control problems:  coordination problems 
and  appropriation concerns, the latter being related to risks of potential opportunistic behavior 
(Anderson et al., 2014; Dekker, 2004; Dekker et al., 2013; Ding et al., 2013; Langfield-Smith and 
Smith, 2003; Neumann, 2010; Nicholson et al. 2006; Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000; 
Vosselman and Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009).  One solution to these control problems is a 
management control structure, for example incorporating balanced scorecards and incentives.  In 
transaction cost economics, management control structures are subordinate to an overarching 
governance structure that is considered to be an efficient institutional framework that defines the 
boundaries of transactions and that aims to prevent opportunistic behavior or to fight it when it 
occurs (Williamson, 1979).  In a general sense, from a transaction cost economics perspective the 
governance structure and management control structures are the straightforward consequences of 
rational design and managerial negotiation and decision making. They are instruments in the hands 
of powerful distanced and isolated managers.   
However, in practice the management control structure may not be the result of rather 
straightforward negotiation, decision making and design. Moreover, it may not achieve what its 
negotiators and designers intended; their intended functionality (their ‘ideals’) may not match with 
their real consequences.  To paraphrase Hopwood (1987): the management control structure has the 
tendency to become what it was not. Decisions and designs develop and mediate in the constitution 
of organizations or organizational relationships. They are a promise (see also Mouritsen and Kreiner, 
forthcoming); they open-up rather than close-down. Acknowledging that a management control 
structure is both the result of and results in largely unpredictable network effects, this study views 
the management control structure as an actor-network in a process of governization1.  Our notion of 
governization refers to the assembly and qualification of actions, actors, places and devices that 
produce a pattern that can be labeled as ‘governance’. The process of governization is characterized 
by complex interactions between multiple actors, both human and other-than-human.  In the 
process, the management control structure as an other-than-human may be the carrier of multiple 
interests of shifting multiple actors; the structure inscribes these interests rather than prescribing or 
describing behavior from outside the process. The research may thus reveal the power struggles that 
are in the management control structure.   
As an actor-network in a process of governization the management control structure is not a systems 
ontology but a relational ontology.  As a relational ontology the management control structure is 
held together in a socio-material network that is in itself a direct effect of complex interactions (see 
also Ahrens and Chapman, 2006: Mahama et al., 2016). Similar to human actors, as an other-than-
                                                             
1 So, this paper marks a shift from ‘governance’ to ‘processes of governization’.  Such a shift in attention 
corresponds with Caliskan and Callon (2009; 2010) who advocate a shift in attention from the ‘economy’ 
towards ‘processes of economization’. Whereas Caliskan and Callon’s  (2009; 2010) notion of economization 
refers to the assembly and qualification of actions, actors, places  and devices as ‘economic’, our notion of 
governization refers to the assembly and qualification of actions, actors, places  and devices that produce a 
pattern that can be labeled as ‘governance’ 
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human actor the management control structure has agency: a capacity to act and to generate effects 
(Latour, 2005). Of course such agency does not stem from cognitive capabilities or intentions, but 
from its position in a network of associations. Its agency is a relational agency (see also Mahama et 
al. , 2016).  
Following Caliskan and Callon (2009; 2010) in their reasoning on processes of economization, we 
propose that processes of governization emerge from situated matters of concern; for example 
concerns about costs or quality of services.  The subsequent situated problematizations may result in 
a specific development of identities of human and other-than-human actors (one of them a 
management control structure) and their associations.  In the process, agency, that is an actor’s 
capacity to act and to generate effects (Latour, 2005), is distributed across the human and other-
than-human actors.  As a result, human actors come to act and develop a certain identity.  Once 
equipped with proper materials and devices human actors may come to act rationally and perhaps 
opportunistically; in the extreme case they may develop a full identity as Homo Economicus (Callon, 
2007).  Rationality and opportunism are thus possible consequences of processes of governization, 
and they are situated in time-space. They cannot be taken for granted.  They are interactively shaped  
rather than relatively stable human traits.  
By making an ontological turn from a systems ontology to a relational ontology we position the 
management control structure at the center of dynamics in intrafirm relationships situated in the 
municipality of The Hague.  In doing so, we engage with studies that, rather than on management 
control in a more broad sense, focus on accounting in interfirm relationships.  For example, 
Mouritsen and Thrane (2006) pose the question as to how accounting can be a force (or an actor) in 
establishing and developing interfirm relationships. They propose that accounting can be 
conceptualized as an actor that mediates, shapes and constructs interfirm relations through self-
regulating and orchestration mechanisms.  Chua and Mahama (2007) examine “the antecedent 
conditions and networks that influence the development and operation of performance measures” 
(Chua and Mahama, 2007, p. 47). They examine how the emergence, operation, and functionality of 
accounting numbers are network effects.  We broaden the analysis by concentrating on management 
control rather than on accounting per se.  Particularly, we aim to examine how the emergence, 
operation and functionality of a management control structure for a shared service center are 
network effects. In a more general sense, we engage with work that considers the change of 
accounting and control to be a drift with unpredictable outcomes rather than a centrally-controlled 
affair (Quattrone and Hopper, 2001; Andon et al. , 2007).  Andon et al. (2007) emphasize the 
experimental and relational nature of accounting drift. Experimental, because the outcomes of 
change are unpredictable, and thus in order to improve accounting and control practices, a trial and 
error approach is required. Relational, because "accounting change is connected to wide ranging 
networks of human and other-than-human elements, which variously inform and influence change” 
(Andon et al., 2007, p. 281). The means-ends relationships often are not well understood, highly 
uncertain and always in the making, diverse and in conﬂict (Chua and Mahama, 2007).  The study 
also engages with a study by Kastberg (2015) that aims to explore control problems of horizontal 
organizational relationships, particularly between a shared service center and its internal customers, 
and to discuss how different problems are related to accounting and control initiatives.  Rather than 
focusing on the governance structure or management control structure in a broad sense, Kastberg 
(2015) concentrates on the formative role of accounting per se in addressing problems.   
We aim to contribute by demonstrating how the emergence and development of a management 
control structure for a shared service center is the result of iterative cycles of both centrally-
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controlled activity and drifting.  To that end, we draw on the concepts of framing and overflowing as 
they are developed by Callon (1998; 1998b). Framing is an attempt to centrally control the 
development of the management control structure and to produce order, whereas overflowing 
produces drift and disorder.  More in particular we study the iterative cycles of framing and 
overflowing that produce a developing management control structure for a shared service center in 
the municipality of The Hague. It is through these iterative cycles of framing and overflowing, of 
producing order and producing disorder, that the management control structure is translated.  
Translation here refers to the situated processes by which associations are forged between actors, 
the identities of actors stabilized, the possibilities of interaction and the limits of maneuver 
negotiated and delimited (Callon, 1986). We study how, in a secluded space in the form of a 
calculative center, translation results in the framing of transactions, actors and of the spaces in which 
these actors meet: hierarchical spaces, market-like spaces or communal spaces. The study then 
reveals how and to what extent the frames realize themselves in the municipality of The Hague. It is 
investigated whether the management control structure succeeds in bringing its framed transactions 
and identities into life in the municipality at large. Actors may not accept the invitation that is 
embedded in the frame because they do not perceive it to be in their interests, and thus act 
otherwise. Then, the frame that results from secluded activity in the calculative center produces 
overflows.  Depending on the power of the actors involved, the overflows may result in reframing.  
By using the concepts of framing and overflowing, the study also engages with previous studies that 
use the concepts of framing and overflowing for different purposes, for example in making sense of a 
change in the identity of strategic actors in a company (Skaerbaek and Tryggestad, 2010); or in 
making sense of an unexpected outcome of public sector accountability innovations (Christensen and 
Skærbæk , 2007); or in analyzing the unexpected consequences  of risk management as a tool for 
internal audit activities (Vinnari and  Skærbæk, 2014).   
In sum, the management control structure for the SSC is the vantage point of our study into 
processes of governization.  Rather than the result of relatively straightforward design and 
implementation (a systems ontology) it is portrayed as an actor-network subjected to processes of 
(re)framing and overflowing that are both centrally-controlled and drifting. Multiple interests are 
involved in the development of a management control structure. The study reveals how the 
management control structure is inscribed and to what degree the inscriptions in the management 
control structure are effective. Do the actors in the macrocosm accept the invitation incorporated in 
the inscriptions? Are agencies really distributed as they are inscribed? Are the inscribed interaction 
patterns realized?  Do the overflows result in reframing?   
In short, the paper aims to substantiate how the management control structure is a fluid relational 
ontology rather than a systems ontology.  Our field research is guided by a sensitizing framework  
which we outline in the next section.  
 
A sensitizing framework of translation 
Translation 
Callon et al. (2011) use the term translation to describe the process through which a ‘macrocosm’ is 
taken from one state to another. This translation process starts with the emergence of matters of 
concern. Such matters create a platform for problematizing and a stage in which novel phenomena 
are made perceptible (Callon et al., 2011). The problematization may lead to secluded analysis and 
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framing in a micro-cosm. The micro-cosm takes the form of a secluded place, a calculative centre in 
which manipulation takes place.  From the macro-cosm reality is transformed and transported to the 
micro-cosm through the use of references to that macro-cosm.  The references to the macro-cosm 
are labelled as inscriptions: signs that translate the macro-cosm in its absence. The first translation is 
thus the creation and transportation of inscriptions in and from the macro-cosm. Then, in a second 
translation that takes place in the calculative centre, inscriptions are (re)produced and transformed 
by a distinct group that intends to reconfigure the macro-cosm from a distance. The macro-cosm is 
transformed to a ‘purified and simplified world’ (Callon et all., 2011, p. 59), a world that is 
manipulable.  A specific group of people studies and manipulates the inscriptions in order to frame a 
new desired reality, which can be transported back into the macrocosm. In the calculative center 
inscriptions carrying the interests of the actors involved are (re)produced, discussed, and interpreted. 
A third translation is the process of bringing the results of the second translation back from the 
calculative center into the macro-cosm. Here, support of allies has to be organized; allies that also 
take an interest in bringing the result of the second translation into life. Some alliances are already 
created in the first translation, but their solidity and viability is tested in translation 3.  
The different stages in the translation process are summarized in table 1 
Table 1 about here 
Framing and overflowing 
The management control structure as it is produced in a micro-cosm provides a frame that 
“establishes a boundary within which interactions –the significance and content of which are self-
evident to the protagonists- take place more or less independently of their surrounding context 
(Callon, 1998, p. 249). As a frame, a management control structure stabilizes the conditions of 
interactions and makes it possible to calculate the outcome of interactions (see also Kastberg, 2015). 
In the framing process that takes place in the calculative center multiple powerful organizational 
actors construct and translate the management control structure so that it fits their own 
assumptions, views, interests and aims. They then enroll the frame of the management control 
structure to satisfy their interests and to strengthen their influence (see also D’Adderio, 2011). 
The process of framing is a process that is never complete (Kastberg, 2015). This is because the frame 
is to make selective inclusions and exclusions (Callon et al. 2011). In the macro-cosm,  as a 
consequence of its incompleteness, the frame will produce overflows.  Overflows are variations of or 
outside the frame which were not intended or foreseen, and are the norm rather than the exception. 
Through overflows the limitations of the frame become visible which can inspire debate and may 
result in reframing.  
Framing the management control structure for an SSC includes decisions on vertical accountability 
relationships and on internal client-buyer relationships. Framing determines and identifies the ‘socio-
technical agencements’ (Callon, 1998; 2007; 2009).  Such an ‘agencement’ is an assemblage (of 
humans and other-than-humans) that puts a human actor (for example, a manager) at the center.  In 
order to frame the identity of the human actor and to enhance the establishment of a successful 
‘socio-technical agencement’, the human actor is equipped with ‘prostheses’ which help in 
calculations, for example material elements, computer programs, routines. The frame of the 
management control structure also shapes the profiles of the goods and services that are transacted, 
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and the way the ‘agencements’ interact or transact in the spaces in which they meet: hierarchical 
spaces, communal spaces or market-like spaces.  
The framing process is intended to result in the enrollment of the management control structure as 
an artifact in the macro-cosm. There, it aims to realize itself. However, as a consequence of the 
incompleteness of the frame, iterative cycles of overflowing and possible reframing emerge in the 
context of conflicts of interests (see also D’Adderio, 2008). 
In sum, we unlock the management control structure by drawing on the notions of (re)framing, 
overflowing and, in a more general sense, translation. In a micro-cosm, through inscriptions the 
management control structure is loaded with intentions of powerful actors and then brought into the 
macro-cosm (in this case the municipality of The Hague) with the intention to frame ‘agencements’ 
and interactions/transactions.  The management control structure provides the cognitive boundaries 
for interactions, but at the same time these boundaries are challenged in the macro-cosm.  The 
management control structure has to struggle for survival. The question that becomes relevant is if 
the management control structure as an actor-network is able to create the world in which it can 
function. Do other actors in the macro-cosm accept the invitation?   
Methodology 
This research draws on theories and methods about framing, reframing and translation (Callon et. al, 
2011). The domain of the study is the field; specifically the municipality of The Hague.   As the 
research focuses on the management control structure as an actor-network, we take a relationalist 
stance. It is well recognised that in research from such a relationalist stance the distinction between 
‘neutral observation’ and ‘intervention’, or between ‘representation’ and ‘intervention’ (Hassard and 
Cox, 2013; Callon et. al, 2011) is not tenable. The researcher is inside the field, and has a position 
that is symmetrical to that of the other actors in the field. He takes part in the shaping and 
enactment of the management control structure. He is closely engaged, rather than objectively 
distanced (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006).  In a more general sense, from a relational perspective on the 
governance and control of and in intrafirm relations the role of theory differs from a rational 
perspective.  Rather than being informed by content-theory (e.g. transaction cost economics) in 
order to try and explain the existence of a specific management control structure, the researcher 
attempts to trace the footsteps of the theory (for example organizational economics) in the process 
of governization as it is situated in time-space. In other words, rather than an explanandus for a 
management control structure that is ‘out there’ the theory may be performative in the 
development of situated management control structures.  Organizational economics, then, is not an 
informer, but a performer.  In short: the role of theory is not to inform the researcher in explaining a 
specific management control structure, but to (subtly) perform in the development of the 
management control structure.  It is performative in the process of governization.  
Not only did one of the authors participate in the process under investigation in the identity of a 
researcher, but also in the identity of a manager in the municipality.  Although access to information 
and to key players is often a challenge when conducting field research (Baxter & Chua, 1998), for this 
study it was thus relatively easy to obtain access. One of the authors was already quite 
knowledgeable of the research site. Regular discussions between the authors provided a space for 
reflecting on and making sense of (tacit) experiences.  
At different stages in the research process there were interviews with a number of persons (see table 
1 for a summary).  All interview reports were presented to the interviewed persons for feedback in 
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order to ensure that adequate interpretations were made. The advisor of the Director of the SSC also 
read previous drafts of the case description as presented in this paper. 
‘Ex post’ interviews with key players in the framing and enacting of the management control 
structure of the SSC were conducted. These interviews were organized at the tail of the empirical 
research and were meant to thoroughly reflect on the interpretations made by the researchers. The 
key players included the Deputy Municipal Secretary, the Chair of the Integral Customer Council, the 
Project Director in charge of the development of the SSC, multiple directors within the SSC and the 
advisor of the General Director of the SSC (who was also strongly involved in the process of 
developing the SSC).  
In addition, notes of official and unofficial meetings were studied.  Successive drafts of formal 
documents were essential sources of data in the research process. To a certain extent, they displayed 
the process of translation. Table 2 shows the interviews that were taken, and when. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The field study  
Problematizing governance:  some first translations 
Essentially, the study addresses the development of a shared service center (SSC) and its 
management control structure in the municipality of The Hague (the “Intern Dienstencentrum”: IDC). 
The processing of the concept of the SSC started in 2004.  A management control structure was to be 
developed in order to ensure that the SSC would perform as intended. 
 At the time the municipality of The Hague adopted the idea of a shared service centre, the General 
Municipal Management Team (GMT) had a business-like attitude.  The GMT was concerned to 
enhance collaboration between the multiple departments. The GMT thought that such collaboration 
would lead to increased efficiency, particularly in the provision of services the departments had in 
common. It experienced an increasing need for the establishment of such closer cooperation 
because it felt the political pressure for cut backs.  It knew that the creation of a shared service 
center was a common answer in times of austerity.  In this sense, ideas traveling in the macro-cosm 
of society at large were transported to and transformed in the micro-cosm of the municipality of The 
Hague. They were translated into texts that inscribed a first concept of the shared service centre.  For 
the purpose of effective and efficient provision of services the GMT decided that the concept had to 
be further developed, including a development of a management control structure: an institutional 
framework within which interactions between the SSC and other departments could take place. The 
GMT claimed two specific underlying matters of concern for this decision. First, there was the 
political pressure for cost reduction regarding services.  Second, the vulnerability with respect to 
standard services in the multiple municipal departments was perceived as being too high.  Both 
economies of scale and vulnerability were thus important reasons for the development of an SSC and 
its management control structure.    
In 2004 the GMT (that may be perceived as a calculative centre, a micro-cosm in the macro-cosm of 
the municipality of The Hague) decided to start an ‘experiment’.  General models of the concept of a 
shared service centre were translated into more specific texts and models for the municipality of The 
9 
 
Hague, texts and models that inscribed a first framework of the sharing of services. With the aim of 
further developing the concept of shared services, the GMT then decided to introduce ‘pilot projects’ 
on the shared provision of services. Participation in the project was not mandatory for departments. 
The direct purpose of these ‘pilot projects’ was to learn from first experiences with shared services 
and their governance. The experiments took place in the hierarchical context of a ‘concern- 
department model’ in which the ‘integral’ accountability 2of the heads of departments is one of the 
leading principles. 
In 2006 the new elected Board of Mayor and Deputy Mayors decided about imposing cut backs, as it 
wanted the municipal organization to become more effective and efficient. This put new pressure on 
the experiment on the management control structure of the SSC, and led to a renewed guideline in 
which the principle of voluntary participation was abandoned. GMT now believed that mandatory 
participation of all departments in the shaping and working of an SSC was the only way to achieve 
the targeted budget cuts. So, renewed problematization led to a renewed activity in the calculative 
centre.  
The General Municipal Management Team (GMT) made the final decision for the establishment of 
the SSC by on January 3th, 2007. It was decided that the SSC should be formally launched on January 
1st, 2008. In order to be able to do this a plan was developed containing a roadmap for the 
development of the SSC and its management control structure.  On May 30th a ‘time table’ was 
presented.  The GMT decided that a steering committee would further guide the project through 
different stages. In terms of Callon et al. (2011) the GMT extended its calculative centre or micro-
cosm with a steering committee that had to frame a management control structure. The GMT 
inscribed a number of principles and conditions for the translation that had to take place in the 
extended micro-cosm. Two members of the GMT were included in the steering committee. The GMT 
appointed the Director of ‘Personnel and Organization’ a project leader, and she decided on the 
membership in the project team of persons located in various municipal departments. The ‘time 
table’ also contained some guiding principles for the development of the shared service center and 
its management control structure. For example, it stated that the current Facilities Department 
would cease to exist and that the IDC (SSC) would be a ‘company’3 within the context of the 
municipality. Some other important conditions for the development of the SSC and its management 
control structure were: 1) no policy making capacity in the organization of SSC, as this was the 
domain of the Department of Municipal Administration;  2)the SSC was to be a partner for  the 
municipal departments;  captive buying would be the norm, no access to external markets;  3)the 
integral accountability of departmental managers  was not to be effected; 4)standardized service 
delivery should be based on mutual trust; 5)transparency in accountability and in price. 
                                                             
2 Integral accountability is a management concept introduced in the Dutch government in the 1980’s. The 
rationale behind this concept is to make management more accountable for the effectiveness and efficiency of 
their work processes and to generate cost savings. Management is accountable for the realization of targets 
(output) and controls the amount of resources (personnel, financial, etcetera) needed to reach the targets 
(derived from: Buurma & Jacobs, 1999). 
3 The use of the word ‘company’ was intended to emphasize the difference of the SSC with the departments. 
The SSC was supposed to deliver supportive processes and to focus on customer satisfaction and efficiency. The 
departments could focus on their core processes of developing and executing policies. This characterization of 
the SSC also explained the reason why policy making was no longer part of the shared service organization, and 
why the municipal secretary was held accountable, as is explained later on. 
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The project in the micro-cosm had a seven-month’ time schedule. The process from plan to start was 
rather straightforward.  The final draft of the so-called ‘blueprint’ (in which the organization of the 
centre, the products and services and the governance of the SSC were described) was ready in 
December. In November, based on the blueprint that at that time still had to be finalised, the Board 
of Mayor and Deputy Mayors decided that the IDC would start at January 1th 2008. Because of the 
tight schedule and because of the high impact of the project, it was initiated and executed on senior 
managerial level. The steering committee and the project leader were staffed with high level 
executives. Chaired by the project leader a central team was formed that consisted of the chairs of 
the different working groups. The working groups were staffed with a mixture of members and 
experts from the different departments.  
Framing the management control structure in the extended micro-cosm 
In the micro-cosm the project group governed by the steering committee produced a ‘blueprint’ (as 
the committee called it) for the SSC.  The ‘blueprint’ included the frame of the management control 
structure.  This structure was developed by one of the working groups connected to the project 
group: the working group Governance. This working group was chaired by the Head of the 
Department of Municipal Taxes,  and complemented with a member of the management of the 
Facilities Department and two organizational consultants (one of them a senior) from the 
Department of Municipal Administration. The proposed institutional framework within which 
interactions were to take place, included frames for the socio-technical agencements, characteristics 
and basic service levels of the multiple services, and a frame for service level agreements. As for the 
socio-technical agencements, two important agents were designated and equipped: the Director of 
the SSC and the Municipal Secretary. The Director of the SSC was to be accountable to the Municipal 
Secretary. Moreover, another important socio-technical agencement was founded on the collective 
of departmental managers. These managers collectively had to decide on the price, quality and 
quantity of the basic service delivery to all departments. Their decisions were to be included in a 
service level agreement that was to be compulsory for all departments.  Each departmental manager 
was also designated and equipped as a socio-technical agencement.  Each of them was allowed to 
negotiate so-called ‘plus agreements’ with the Director of the SSC for additional service levels.   
The frame for the management control structure also included proposals for the mission, vision and 
objectives of the new SSC in the wider context of the Municipality of The Hague, and of the way its 
performance should be measured given the Director’s accountability towards the Municipal 
Secretary.  
The agents thus were to meet each other in hierarchical spaces through vertical accountability 
relationships  (relationship between the Municipal Secretary and the director of the SSC), in 
communal spaces (the collective of departmental managers), and in market-like spaces (the 
negotiation of ‘plus-agreements’). The various managers were not to be allowed to buy or sell at 
external market places; there was to be captive buying and selling.  
In the framing process the working group enacted inscriptions provided by other governmental and 
non-governmental organizations that also introduced shared service centers.  One leading example 
was the Municipality of Tilburg, at that time a frontrunner in the development of a SSC, a perceived 
‘centre of excellence’. In Tilburg, collegial co-operation proved to be an important factor in the 
perceived success of the SSC. Therefore, the working group loaded values such as ‘partnership’, ‘co-
operation’ and ‘mutual trust’ into the frame of the management control structure.  
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The project leader of the IDC :  
 
‘We were convinced that values like ‘partnership’, ‘co-operation’ and ‘mutual trust’ were necessary to 
make the concept of shared services work.’  
 
In the micro-cosm a frame was developed that placed the collective interest of the municipality at 
large above the interests of specific departments or persons. SSC’s mission, it was believed, could 
only be accomplished if co-operation within the municipality was key and based on mutual trust and 
partnership. This led to the proposal to call the SSC ‘Our Internal Service Delivery Center’.  The vision 
behind this was also reflected in the mission statement of the SSC:  
‘The IDC provides and manages good basic services for the municipality and the interest of the 
municipality at large is leading.’   
However, when the workgroup discussed the proposed mission with the steering committee, the 
steering committee decided that the terminology of ‘our’ IDC had to change in simple  ‘IDC’.  
As the project leader of the development of the SSC states:  
 ‘The use of the word ‘our’ felt to be too artificial.’  
The advisor of the Director of the SSC adds:  
‘The use of the word ‘our’ had its value in the process of the building of the IDC, but doesn’t fit the 
way of working around here.’ 
Apparently, the steering committee opted for a more business-like attitude.  Although a trusting 
atmosphere was considered to be important, the steering committee also wanted to bring in 
hierarchy-based and market-based governance for the SSC.  
The core of the frame may be depicted in figure 1:  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Figure 2 visualises that the SSC operates by mandate of the municipal secretary who is at the top of 
the triangle. On the left side the representatives of the departments are depicted; on the right side 
the relevant agents from the SSC. 
The relevant agents are the Deputy Mayor, the Municipal Secretary, the Heads of Departments and 
the Director of the SSC.  The Deputy Mayor is not included in the figure because the association 
between the Municipal Secretary and the Deputy Mayor is characterised by political responsibility 
rather than a governance responsibility. The Municipal Secretary reports to the Deputy Mayor about 
the performance of the SSC; the Deputy Mayor does not directly participate in the governance of the 
SSC. Nevertheless, he is authorized to provide boundaries for the scope, quality and price of the 
service delivery of the SSC.  The budget available for shared services is assigned by the City Council 
and the Deputy Mayor has a political responsibility to the City Council regarding this budget.  
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The multiple actors that relate to the SSC will meet in different spaces. Essentially, they will meet in a 
hierarchical space in which there are different relations of responsibility and accountability.  The 
Municipal Secretary is to be responsible for the process that brings a common service level 
agreement (SLA) into being.  An SLA specifies the different goods and services to be provided by the 
SSC, and the conditions under which they will be supplied.  Because of his political responsibility to 
the Mayor and Deputy Mayors he is allowed to provide the parties with directives. Through his 
approval of the SLA he mandates the Director of the SSC to provide the services. Ex post, the Director 
of the SSC, being responsible for a proper preparation and execution of the SLA’s, reports to the 
Municipal Secretary about the execution of the SLA. More in particular, he reports about the 
progress in standardisation of products, services and processes. The existence of SLA’s points to 
another space where the relevant actors meet: a space of an internal market (be it with captive 
buying and selling) within the context of the municipal hierarchy (see also Minnaar and Vosselman,  
2013), where parties transact.  
Departmental managers are to be important agents in the governance of the SSC. This is related to 
the management philosophy within the municipality that all the departmental managers have an 
‘integral’ accountability. The departmental managers are framed both as a collective and an 
individual actor.  The framing of a collective may be seen as an attempt to both increase 
standardization and to economize on transaction costs; the collective of departmental managers 
enables the framing of a collective transaction between the SSC and the collective of departmental 
managers governed by a so-called ‘basic’ service level agreement.  This SLA is an agreement that runs 
for one year and that is signed by the departmental managers and the director of the SSC. 
Collectively, the departmental managers will have to decide on the ‘basic’ service level agreement.  
Such a collective endeavour also provides a communal space where actors (departmental managers) 
meet and where mutual trust and partnership may develop.  All departmental managers are 
supposed to sign the agreement. 
Each departmental manager is also framed as an individual actor. He or she is empowered to 
negotiate a ‘plus service level agreement’ for his or her department.  Such an agreement concerns 
services that are specific to the department at hand.  A very specific service level agreement is to be 
the one between the SSC and the Department of Municipal Administration.  Because of the political 
functions of this department the actors in the micro-cosm think that the desired services may differ 
from the services that will be provided to other departments.  
 
Summarizing the process of translation in the micro-cosm it can be observed that a secluded expert 
group framed agencies, encounters and goods/services.  Through such framing activity the concept 
of governance was translated in such a way that it was thought suitable in the context of the 
municipality of The Hague.  In the manipulable world of the micro-cosm, through discussing the 
expert group manufactured inscriptions that could be transported back into the macrocosm. The 
inscriptions included a governance triangle that reflected the identity of the important actors in the 
governance of the SSC and encounters between these actors in hierarchical, market-like and 
communal spaces.  The framing of services concerned facilities, housing, and human resourse 
services (HRS).  The frame of the services included the characteristics of the services, the associated 
costs and critical performance indicators.  The steering committee in the micro-cosm spoke about a 
‘blueprint’ for a first format of the SLA, and of a basis for further development of this ‘contract’.  In 
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fact, there were three potential formats for service level agreements: a basic agreement, a plus 
agreement and a specific agreement between the Municipal Secretary and the Director of the SSC.  
At core, the identities of the actors as framed in the micro-cosm were those of a supplier and of 
buyers. This suggests that the interactions between multiple actors were positioned in client-supplier  
relationships and were to a substantial extent to take the form of transactions (between the Director 
of the SSC and the collective of departmental heads; between the Director of the SSC and the 
individual departmental heads; between the Director of the SSC and the Municipal Secretary). 
However, it was not the framing of purely self-interested actors obsessed by the calculation-
optimization of their own departmental interests; it was not the framing of Homo Economicus in its 
pure form. The expert team took important aspirations of co-operation, trusting and partnership into 
account. This was for example reflected in the framing of a collective agent (the collective of 
departmental heads) and in the emphasis of the ‘our’-character of the proposed SSC.  
The framing in the micro-cosm included an interessement of multiple actors. However, there were 
tensions. For example, the work council of the Facility Department complains (in writing) about the 
confined involvement of co-workers in the project.  
“…the participants in the working groups (…) are distant of the daily working process of the Facility 
Department and the expertise of the Facility department is only limitedly made use of. This does not 
help inbuilding commitment to the establishment of the SSC (…).”  
(- Letter of the works council to the director of the facility department) 
The project leader also acknowledges that the involvement of management of the Facility 
Department was limited. 
“In the project little attention was paid to the involvement of the middle management of the Facility 
Department (..) I would do that differently now. I would go and talk to them, take them out to dinner. 
We just didn’t think of that at the time.” 
 
At the end of the framing process in the micro-cosm the Director of the SSC is appointed. He also has 
thoughts about the way the IDC and its governance were framed. 
“When I was appointed the blueprint already passed so many committees that there was no chance 
of making any changes at that point. But, I already knew I had another view on the management 
control structure than as it was depicted in the blueprint.” 
 
With the decision of the Board of Mayor and Deputy Mayors to establish the SSC its existence as of 
January 1st 2008 is a fact. The question then becomes how the management control structure will 
perform in daily practice? Do the inscriptions loaded in the management control structure provide 
stable cognitive boundaries within which interactions take place (is it a real ‘blueprint’), or do they 
entail overflows and, if yes, do the overflows entail reframing? And perhaps the most essential 
question: to what extent is the management control structure performative in creating a co-
operation between the SSC and other departments based on mutual trust and partnership? 
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Back to the macro-cosm: overflows  
Once entered into the macro-cosm of the municipality, a number of overflows emerge. The most 
important overflows concern the insufficient agency distributed to management accountants or 
controllers; the captiveness of buying from the SSC; the positioning of the new institutions reflected 
through the governance ‘triangle’ related to existing institutions (standard bodies and committees in 
the municipality) and, therewith, the roles and responsibilities of actors; the lack of quality of the 
human resource services; the definition of the services; a lack of co-ordination in determining the 
collective demand by the collective actor. 
With the introduction of a basic service delivery the way in which the costs were calculated and 
particularly the way they were allocated to the different departments, changed.  Because of the 
change in allocation the departmental budgets also had to change. In the macro-cosm, this caused 
major discussions, particularly between controllers and departmental managers.   
“Every meeting of the controllers we had discussion about the budgetary implications of the services 
of the SSC. Because of the introduction of the basic service delivery we had to redistribute the budgets 
in order to give every department enough budget to pay the SSC. But, somehow, there were always 
negative budgetary implications, we hardly ever heard about positive budgetary implications that 
could be used to compensate. That was hard to believe because we were not spending more than we 
did before.” 
- controller IDC 
The discussion apparently fitted within a prevailing culture in which Homo Economicus was active. 
The owner: 
“The municipality of The Hague always had a kind of ‘fightculture’ were the interests of the own 
department prevailed over the interest of the municipality as a whole. So, on a scale of 1 to 10 trust is 
not very high, it is changing thought.” 
 
In the first year after the launch of the SSC there was much discussion in the Committee of 
Controllers in which the controllers of the multiple departments were united. The Committee of 
Controllers was consulted, but not fully involved in the original framing in the micro-cosm.  As a 
consequence of the fundamental change in cost allocation the budgetary consequences for the 
departments were large but were not fully predictable; the budget allocation consequences just 
could not be discussed in the tight time schedule of the framing in the calculative centre.  This is also 
the reason why the Committee of Controllers could not be fully involved in the framing process.  
When the frame resulting from a first translation in the micro-cosm entered the macro-cosm, the 
magnitude of financial consequences and the lack of full consent about these consequences resulted 
in hot overflows. The discussion not only focused on how the financial consequences had to be 
calculated and how the budget consequences had to be taken into account, but also on the clarity of 
definitions of the services and on the authorization of actors who should decide on financial issues . 
Controllers aimed at an inscription of their (collective) interests in the management control 
structure: 
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“The committee of controllers prefers the establishment of one principal board that decides on the 
SLA and accompanying costs. Preferably this is the committee of controllers itself.”  
(- Minutes of the meeting of committee of controllers (January 21th, 2009)) 
There is another issue that is related to controllership.  Although the frame inscribes ‘plus service 
delivery’ on the basis of captive buying, in the macro-cosm external buying continued to exist.  For 
example, the design and printing of media are services that are not only bought from the market, but 
still also from external suppliers.  Before the concept of an SSC developed there was a strong belief 
that in order to improve the effectiveness of the organization, competition was essential.  At the 
start of the SSC-project, however, the idea of competition was replaced by the idea of performance 
measurement, in combination with benchmarking.  More specifically, the GMT opted for a 
movement form ‘market’ to more ‘hierarchy’ and beyond,  that is more unified governance on the 
basis of trust and mutual partnership. In the macro-cosm, however, a number of departments did 
not change from their external supplier towards the internal supplier (the SSC). The main reason for 
this was that media services were not given much priority in the heads of the departmental 
managers, while apparently the Director of the SSC was not in a position to change this because the 
GMT did not totally agree on it. 
The projectleader SSC: 
‘On different issues of service delivery things did not change, because one (within the GMT) did not 
agree totally on that particular subject. Those were also the subjects that were of no particular 
interest to anyone, like was the case with the media services.’ 
 
The Director of the SSC is, on the one hand, advocating a stronger alignment with existing allocations 
of decision rights and existing institutions. On the other hand, he warns against too strong a 
‘blueprint’ character of the management control structure:   
“I needed a management control structure that was more aligned with the daily practice and the 
existing bodies and committees within the municipality of The Hague.  Otherwise, I was convinced, it 
would not work. And, you need a firm formal structure to resort to when it is necessary, but in daily 
practice you should not need it too much.’ 
- director SSC 
In the midrange planning for the SSC (2010) it is stated: 
“There is not an unambiguous control model for the SSC. There are a lot of different committees and 
customers councils and their role in relation to one another, but also with respect to the role of the 
owner and policy makers is not clear. The process of making a service level agreement for the basic 
service delivery is not clear and seems –according to its long production time- not efficient.” 
(- Midrange Planning SSC, 2010) 
With these observations the Director of the SSC is a spokesman of many other actors that are 
involved in the governance of the SSC.  In many discussions hot overflows (that is, overflows resulting 
in re-framing) emerged. There was a broadly felt need for more clarity in the description of roles and 
responsibilities; a need for one governance board for the SSC was expressed; there was a need for 
more clarity about the way the interests of the internal customers of the SSC were taken care of 
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(customer counsil(s));  a lack of visibility of the Department of Municipal Administration as a 
‘company policy maker’ was experienced.   
The management control structure as initially framed in the micro-cosm also proved to be 
performative in the macro-cosm in the sense that it provoked change into the way the so-called 
‘business management’ (the management of the provision of services) was organized in the 
municipality. First, the management control structure with its emphasis on collective (all 
Departmental Heads) and individual (individual Departmental Heads) ‘customers’ and a ‘supplier’ 
(the SSC) challenged existing ways of organizing within the Departments.  Here, ‘business 
management’ was traditionally organized along lines of so-called ‘disciplines ‘(Human Resource 
Management, Finance, Information Management, etcetera) and was not concentrated in specific 
departmental unit.  The development of the SSC and the framing of its management control 
structure induced a change in the organizational architecture within the Departments, because the 
transactions between’ customers’ and ‘supplier’ concerned all services.   In a number of 
Departments, the responsibility for all ‘disciplines’ became concentrated in one unit, headed by a 
Head of Business Management.  This change also challenged the existence of committees of 
members of the various departments that were organized around ‘disciplines’.  A need for another 
architecture of department-overarching committees emerged. Between the newly appointed Heads 
of Business Management the need for a committee to align initiatives and to connect them to the 
municipal level grew.  However, as not all departments created one business management unit, 
discussion arose as to the composition of such a committee and the timing of its start. It is in this 
process where the first idea of a so-called ‘Integral Customer Counsil’ emerged and found fertile 
ground.   
The Director of the SSC was very much in favour of this idea. Apparently, the institution of such a 
council would match his interests. 
“In my opinion the Integral Customer Council is the first step on the way to a business management 
council within the municipality of The Hague. In that council we should discuss the service delivery of 
the IDC, but also make connections between proposed policy and developments in the field.” 
 
An Integral Customer Council would create a space in which management form SSC and Heads of 
Business management could formally meet. 
Re-framing in a micro-cosm 
In the fall of 2009 a new working group is constituted by the Committee of Controllers. It gets the 
assignment to ‘(re)define the service delivery of the SSC components housing, other products4 and 
automation in the context of service level agreements, delivery time, key performance indicators 
(KPI’s) and normalized values’ (Assignment working group on SSC service delivery, October 2009). 
The results of the working group are expected to be inputs in the preparation of the SLA 2010. The 
work of the group resulted in a refinement of the definitions of products and services delivered by 
the SSC. The concepts of basic service delivery and service delivery as a so called ‘plus’ remained 
                                                             
4
 ‘Other products’ are products which cannot be categories in Housing, Facilities, Automation or Personnel 
administration services. 
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intact. But there was one interesting development in the re-framing process. In the original framing 
there were specific transactions between the SSC and the City Council and Municipal Clerk’s Office, 
governed by a specific five-year SLA. However, in the macro-cosm the agreements are confirmed in a 
plus SLA that is similar to other plus-SLA. Moreover, the procedures in developing and executing 
SLA’s prove to develop in a similar way.  
At the same time, as a part of the execution of the midrange planning of the SSC, the GMT decides to 
install  a working group Governance. The members of the working group are not only (co)-workers of 
the SSC, but also stakeholders from elsewhere within the municipality and (another) expert on 
governance. Particularly, people from the Department of Municipal Administration participate in the 
working group. They are representatives of the Municipal Secretary and develop ‘company policy’ 
and standards.  The co-makers are representatives of ‘customers’ (departments) selected by the 
different committees organised along the lines of ‘disciplines’ (HR, Finance, Automation, and 
Facilities & Housing). These co-makers are considered to be important for a successful re-framing of 
the management control structure of the SSC.  By installing such a working group ‘Governance’ the 
GMT believed that a further ‘interessement’ of municipal departments could be achieved.  
Apart from the installation of this working group different external experts are consulted.  In co-
operation with the working group one of these experts develops a model which is deemed suitable 
for the municipality of The Hague. The re-framing focuses on two elements: the clarification of the 
roles of multiple actors in the governance of the SSC, and the establishment of a new Board and a 
new Council (the ‘Governance Board ‘and the ‘Integral Customers Council’ ) for the governance of 
the SSC. The re-framing results in a new triangle (figure 2), containing a management control 
structure the GMT decided upon. 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The re-framed governance-triangle expresses three roles: the owner (at the top of the triangle), the 
customer (on the right side) and the supplier (on the left side).  
The new introduced role of owner is assigned to a Deputy Municipal Secretary. The owner has final 
responsibility to the College of Mayor and Deputy Mayors for the (improvement of) so-called 
‘business management’ in the municipality at large.  Such ‘business management’ includes the 
activities of the SSC. The owner of the SSC safeguards the contribution of the SSC to the municipality 
at large. It aligns the SSC’s contribution with municipal policy and standards and it controls  the SSC’s 
operational management. The Deputy Municipal Secretary (mandated by the Municipal Secretary) 
reports to the Deputy Mayor.  
The re-framing also includes a frame for a Governance Board. The Governance Board serves to 
enhance collective ownership of the SSC and consists of the GMT, the owner of the SSC and the 
director of the SSC. The Governance Board is authorized to make strategic decisions, for example 
about the ultimate form and content of a basic SLA.  This Governance Board matches the interests of 
the Director of the SSC, because he is now an extension of the GMT and, thus, has part in strategic 
management at municipal level. Moreover, to improve collective action of the customers an Integral 
Customer Council was framed.  The Integral Customer Council consists of the Heads of the Business 
Management Units of the five biggest departments, the Head of the business management unit of 
the SSC and the Deputy Director of the SSC. The Integral Customer Council advises the Governance 
Board. It discusses the scope and size of the service delivery, the quality of the services as it is 
reflected in SLA’s and reports, and financial issues (prices and benchmarks). 
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With respect to the ‘plus service level agreements’ there were no changes compared to the prior 
frame; they are to be agreed upon between the specific Departments and the SSC (as can be seen in 
figure 1).  
Back to the macro-cosm again 
In 2012, the reframed management control structure is brought back into the macro cosm.  Here, 
new overflows emerge.  These overflows concern a remaining  ambiguity  in the roles and authorities 
of multiple constituencies regarding the SSC: the  Deputy Mayor, the Governance Board, the Integral 
Customer Council and the owner. A dispute about accountability issues remains.  Moreover, there 
remain differences of opinion about the spaces in which the actors have to meet.   
The controller of the SSC states: 
‘It is unclear how exactly goals are set for the SSC. Some of them were stated when the SSC was 
launched. We have to reach operational excellence. On the other hand the Board of Mayor and 
Deputy Mayors imposes a budget cut on the SSC. Those are two different things.’  
 
The SSC has potentially conflicting goals: it should contribute to both a reduction in costs (improve 
efficiency) and to an increase in quality/customer satisfaction. How to cope with such a conflict?  The 
chairman of the Integral Customer Council is of the opinion that the Governance Board should decide 
which goal prevails. The Director of the SSC considers this to be an owner’s role.  However, the 
controller feels that the SSC should make most of the decisions itself. The Director of the SSC thinks 
that strategic goal setting for the SSC should take place in the Governance Board. He is of the opinion 
that if the Governance Board would not be in the lead of the goal setting process, the SSC would just 
become a centralized staff department. The owner emphasises the need to take a next step: the 
focus on operational excellence should to a certain extent give way to a focus on strategic issues.  
Also the issue of accountability remains. According to the frame the Director of the SSC should report 
to the owner about the business management of the SSC. However, the Director of the SSC thinks he 
should report to the Governance Board in which the owner participates. The owner adds that the 
accountability of the SSC is complex.  There also is a need for accountability to the ‘customers’. But, 
being a part of the Municipality The Hague, the SSC also is accountable to the Board of Mayor and 
Deputy Mayors. It has to account for its financial performances and for its achievements in a more 
general sense.  
According to the chairman of the Integral Customer Council a big flaw in the system is (still) the lack 
of ‘company policy’ and standard creation by the Department of Municipal Administration. The other 
keyplayers agree, but the owner points to the complexity of policy setting. According to him, it is 
something that should be done in dialogue with the departments.  
‘In the municipality of The Hague there is not one person who is really the person in charge.’ 
 
The program manager thinks the SSC should not be too modest; it should take the lead so that others 
will follow. It should be in the lead of both the process of producing SLA-agreements with internal 
customers and the accountability reporting processes towards different stakeholders.  He claims 
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that, supported by co-workers from the SSC the re-framing already resulted in a revision of the SLA’s 
and in the decision on new critical performance indicators. 
Finally, in the macro-cosm an important discussion continued about the type of relationship the SSC 
should have with its customers. The chairman of the Integral Customer Council emphasises the 
importance of the development of a strong collaborative relationship between the SSC and its 
customers, because 
 ‘in the end we are one municipality and we have to work with each other.’  
The owner also wants the parties to collaborate in communal space, where they can develop trust-
based co-operative relationships:  
‘For a long time it was normal that people belonged to their own organizational unit or department, 
and not so much to the Municipality. So, they were positioned opposite of one another from the start. 
That had its effect on the SSC and the way it was able to function. So, it is nothing special that it 
happens with the SSC. People are used to work that way. We have to alter that, I am also working on 
that, but it is nothing special’. 
The Director of the SSC, however, stresses that, although it is of importance to develop trusting 
relationships, such relationships should essentially be based on transactions between a supplier (the 
SSC) and buyers (the departments).  Whereas the owner and the chairman of the Integral Customer 
Council opted for cooperation in communal spaces that are even beyond a hybrid space between a 
market and a hierarchy, the Director of the SSC opted for a hybrid form between a market and a 
hierarchy by emphasising the importance of relational market-like relationships.  But apparently the 
governization of transactions certainly did not create a disciplining and individualizing atmosphere. 
The framing of transactions had socializing consequences rather than individualizing or disciplining 
consequences (Roberts, 2001; Zahir-ul-Hassan et al. 2016).  
Discussion 
Our field study provides in- depth insights into the development of a management control structure 
for a shared service centre. It produces knowledge on the way the management control structure is 
constitutive of the development of a shared service centre and its governance.  
In our research site, the establishment of the management control structure is not an instant and 
unproblematic consequence of farsighted choice behaviour by distanced management.  It is not a 
stable and straightforward solution to co-ordination problems and/or problems of potential 
opportunistic behavior in the form of a hierarchical, a market-like or a hybrid (between hierarchy and 
market) template.  Rather, in our field study the development of the management control structure 
is part of a process of governization.  Through the process of governization the management control 
structure becomes an achievement that is constitutive of a shared service centre. The management 
control structure is in the process through which the governance of the shared service centre 
develops; it is not a distanced describer, enabler or prescriber of the practices of governance.   
Essentially, we describe the process of governization as a process of translation.  Associations,  
forged between actors, the identities of actors are stabilized, and the possibilities of 
interaction/transaction and the limits of maneuver are negotiated and delimited. The translation 
takes place in and outside a calculative centre, an extended General Management Team (GMT). In 
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the calculative centre a management control structure is framed through the production of 
inscriptions: signs that translate the governance in its absence and that attach interests as they are 
expressed by powerful actors appointed by the GMT. The inscriptions of the management control 
structure include a ‘governance triangle’ and ‘service level agreements’ (SLA’s). The SLA’s refer to 
client-supplier relations between the SSC and municipal departments, suggesting that the 
interactions between the SSC and municipal departments take the form of transactions.  The framing 
of transactions implies that there is a performance (from the SSC) and a contra-performance (from 
the ‘buying’ departments). Although the intention was that the departments pay for the services, this 
part of the transaction proves hard to establish because of the difficulties in reallocating budgets to 
the multiple departments.  Controllers continue to work on the issue, so that budget allocations and 
cost allocations can be attached to client-supplier relationships and to the agency of the managers 
who are involved in the negotiations and service delivery.  
At core, transaction costs economics specifies efficient governance solutions for transactions with 
various characteristics. Transaction cost economics would claim that efficient encounters between 
the actors in a transaction take place in a hierarchy, a market or in a hybrid form between a market 
and a hierarchy.  An interesting finding of our study is, however, that the space in which actors meet 
develops towards a hybrid with socializing consequences, and even to a communal space.  
Apparently, although there was a shift on the road between hierarchy and market towards market 
transactions (horizontal client-supplier relationships), the process of governization did not only 
follow the narrow road between hierarchy and market, but also took a road towards co-operation 
and collaboration, a road that results in spaces where trusting partnerships may emerge. The 
developing management control structure had socializing consequences rather than individualizing 
or disciplining consequences (Roberts 2001;  Zahir-ul-Hassan et al. 2016).  Through the institution of 
a Governance Board and an Internal Customer Council and through the framing of captive buying 
from the SSC, mutual co-operation and trusting partnership was encouraged.  There was less 
competition and more co-operation. Apparently, transaction costs economics theory was only 
performative to a limited degree.  
The situated process of governization in the municipality started with matters of concern that were 
related to vulnerability, austerity and related budget cuts.  Municipal management problematized 
the efficiency (costs) and quality of services such as Housing and Human Resource Management.  
Management aimed to economize on services. Against the background of circulating ideas about 
shared service centres a first frame of the management control structure was  constructed in a 
calculative centre (a micro-cosm) constituted by the GMT of the municipality.  In the calculative 
centre, multiple powerful actors attached to the management control structure under construction 
and inscribed their (common) interests in it.  The calculative centre framed a management control 
structure that reflected the (general) characteristics of the services, the agency and identity of the 
actors involved in the governance and their associations and interactions.  At core, the framing 
activity was a manipulation of inscriptions; a manipulation of signs that translated ‘governance to be’ 
in its absence. Important inscriptions in our field study were the ‘governance triangle’ and formats 
for service level agreements.  
When the calculative centre delivered the frame of the management control structure to the 
municipality at large (the macro-cosm), the boundaries of the frame proved to be too narrow. 
Although the management control structure attempted to bring its inscriptions into life, it only 
partially succeeded in doing so. When the frame was brought to the macro-cosm a number of actors 
did not directly perceive it to be in their interests to straightforwardly accept the invitation that the 
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management control structure carried.  There were a number of overflows, things that were not 
inscribed in the frame: the agency of controllers;  the continuance of buying from external suppliers;  
the positions and roles of existing bodies and institutions (committees) in the municipality;  the 
proper quality of the HRS;  services that did not fit within their definitions as reflected in the frame;  
co-ordination in determining the collective demand by the collective actor. 
The emerging overflows (of which many were hot, that is they resulted in re-framing activity) give 
evidence that the management control structure is not a simple describer or prescriber, but an 
inscriber. Inscriptions are invitations to behave in a certain way, and apparently the invitations were 
not unproblematic. Only to a limited extent the management control structure directly succeeded in 
realizing itself. Moreover, the management control structure exceeded its traditional functional 
properties as a problem solver. It proved to be performative, it mediated in the constitution of new 
organizational forms for services within the municipal departments and it mediated in the 
constitution of identities. Through its overflows the management control structure induced the 
constitution of an Internal Customer Council and a Governance Board; it induced a redistribution of 
agency across the multiple (micro and macro) actors. In our field study it does not, however, mediate 
in the construction of a stricter Homo Economicus  (Callon et al. 2011). Rather than in the 
construction of calculative and calculable economic men the management control structure 
mediated in the construction of stewards and partners.  The main development in governance was 
not on the road between hierarchy and market, but on a road towards mutual partnership and co-
operation.  The development of the management control structure was certainly not placed in the 
context of potential opportunistic behaviour. It was certainly not a response to appropriation 
concerns.  The actor-network did not entail hierarchization; to a small extent it entailed the 
development of market-like transactions.  But foremost it entailed a further socialization.  
Conclusion 
This study contributes by theorizing the management control structure of a shared service centre as  
a relational ontology.  In processes of governization the structure is shaped and enacted as an actor-
network.  The study theorizes how the management control structure is not the result of a farsighted 
choice for an efficient template of a management control structure as it circulates around the globe, 
but an interactive effect in a process of governization.  It theorizes how the management control 
structure is a mediator rather than an outside solution; how it produces both stability and disorder.   
It is both generated in and constitutive of the governization of the shared service centre.  Such 
governization occurs through iterative cycles of framing and overflowing. The process starts from 
matters of concern that are situated in time-space.  They entail problematization and the creation 
and enrolment of inscriptions.  The creation and the enrolment of inscriptions are not without 
problems.  There is divergence of interests and as a consequence there are power struggles involved.  
In the process of governization the developing management control structure does not enable or 
prescribe, but mediates in the shaping of goods/services, of the identity of actors and of the spaces 
in which these actors meet (see also Miller and Power, 2013).  It is a mediating instrument (Miller 
and O’Leary, 2007). In concert, the human and other-than-human actors may produce subjectivities 
that may take the form of an Economic Man or a Steward. Economic men meet in spaces where they 
can transact. They are self-interested agencies driven by incentives and penalties provided on 
markets or market-like spaces, in hierarchies or in hybrids between markets and hierarchies. 
Stewards, on the other hand, meet in communal spaces, where they are driven by commitments.   
22 
 
Our specific study gives evidence of the development of stewards rather than economic men; in fact, 
a ‘hybrid steward’ is produced. This, however, may well be different in other (public and private) 
organizations. Future studies may provide further insights in differences between organizations. The 
interesting question remains whether and to what extent organizational economics (and particularly 
transaction cost economics) is performative in the processes of governization. Is TCE influential in 
shaping the situated governance? Depending on its performativity TCE may help in the shaping of 
Economic Men. TCE then is not informative for an ‘outside’ explanation of the ‘economic’, but it is 
performative in the development of the situated management control structure.  
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Table 1: Stages in the translation process 
 
  
Where?  What?  What happens?  Who is involved?  
Macro cosm  Problematizing  A novel phenomena is made perceptible  Limited number of 
powerful actors  
Macro cosm -> 
micro cosm  
Translation 1  Transformation and transportation to a 
purified an simplified world  
Alliances between  
powerful actors   
Micro cosm  Translation 2  Translating the macro-cosm in its 
absence   
Secluded group   
Micro cosm -> 
macro cosm  
Translation 3  Enrollment  Stable alliances between 
powerful actors   
 
 
  
26 
 
Table 2: Summary of interviews  
 
Interview with Interview type Date Duration 
Controller shared service center Unstructured 
interview 
05-04-2013 1 hour 
Controller shared service center Semi-structured 
interview 
25-06-2013 40 minutes 
Deputy municipal secretary/ 
Owner shared service center and 
concern director business 
management 
Semi-structured 
interview 
25-06-2013 1 hour and 
25 minutes 
Chairwomen integral customer 
council and director of business 
management of the Department 
of Social Affairs and Employee 
Projects 
Semi-structured 
interview 
25-06-2013 35 minutes 
Director of the shared service 
center 
Semis-structured 
interview 
25-06-2013 1 hour  
Program manager for 
improvement of business 
management 
Semi-structured 
interview 
12-07-2013 1 hour 
Deputy municipal secretary/ 
Owner shared service center and 
concern director business 
management 
Semi-structured 
interview 
09-05-2014 45 minutes 
Member of Integral Customer 
Council and director of business 
management of Department of 
Urban Development, interim 
clustermanager Automation of 
the IDC 
Semi-structured 
interview 
09-05-2014 20 minutes 
Director  of the shared service 
center 
Semi-structured 
interview 
09-05-2014 50 minutes 
Former director of Personnel 
Policy and Organization of the 
municipality of The Hague. 
Semi- structured 
interview 
23-01-2015 1 hour 
27 
 
Former projectleader IDC 
Former director of the IDC Semi-structured 
interview 
06-02-2016 1 hour 
Advisor of the director of the 
IDC 
Semi-structured 
interview 
17-02-2016 1 hour 
Former chairman of the integral 
customers council, director of 
business management of the 
department of Public Services. 
Semi-structured 
interview 
13-07-2016 35 min 
Head of Personnel Policy and 
Organization Strategy and Senior 
Advisor on terms of employment 
and business management 
Semi-structured 
interview 
13-07-2015 37 min 
Manager Personnel and 
Organization of the department 
of Social Affairs and Employee 
Projects 
Semi-structured 
interview 
13-07-2015 31 min 
Productgroupmanager Human 
Resource Services 
Semi-structured 
interview 
14-07-2015 52 min 
Director of Shared Service 
Center 
Semi-structured 
interview 
14-07-2015 44 min 
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Figure 1: Governance frame SSC in The Hague 
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Figure 2: reframed 'governance-triangle' of the SSC in the Municipality of The Hague 
 
 
 
 
 
